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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the implications on banking crises when markets are
populated by agents that neglect tail risks and form expectations conditioned on a
favorable subset of all possible states of the economy. We find that optimal bank liquidity is lower than would be the case when banks are guided by rational expectations,
and, consequently, the banking system is more vulnerable to adverse shocks, which
leads to bank runs. Asset pledgeability of surviving banks is also affected so that their
capacity to raise external funds for purchasing assets of distressed banks is weakened.
Further, we examine the case when asset returns are correlated through securitization.
In this case adverse shocks will be felt uniformly across the banking sector and banks
that survive with the help of a public liquidity backstop will become risk–averse and
reluctant to purchase distressed assets. We also explore a government funded asset
purchase program, that is implemented with an asset price target.
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Introduction

One common factor in financial crises is the market’s misperception of uncertain events.
Instead of carefully considering all possible outcomes of portfolio decisions, investors tend
to neglect events that are very unlikely to occur. These low probability events are in many
cases the worst–case scenarios. A consequence of this is overly optimistic behavior of agents
in financial markets which leads to over–valuation of securities. When things are normal,
risky investments based on the misperceptions are not questioned and therefore continue
uninterrupted. In times of stress, however, the market quickly realizes the misperception
and abruptly reacts even to small hints of bad news; a flight to safety and free fall of asset
prices ensue.
The most recent example is the 2007–2009 financial crisis, which closely followed this
narrative; when banks originated mortgage loans to subprime borrowers and when investors
purchased subprime mortgage loan–related securities, the possibility of the subprime borrowers’ debt service failure was neglected as very unlikely; this optimism allowed the creation
of voluminous risky structured securities which continued until news about mortgage delinquency started to materialize. Investor reaction to these now toxic securities was severe, and
led to bank runs in short–term money markets.1
In this paper, we examine a financial market and banking system populated by agents
that are characterized by such misperceptions. For this, we adopt the model of local thinking
presented in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) and Gennaioli et al. (2012). The model assumes
that agents have a limited ability to make inferences about uncertainties and therefore neglect
tail risks with the lowest probabilities. This leads to decisions and behavior shaped by
excessive optimism and pessimism. The local thinking framework was developed in the spirit
of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s papers (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974) that demonstrate significant deviations from the Bayesian theory
of judgment under uncertainty. Its implication is also akin to Hyman Minsky’s financial
1
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instability hypothesis (Minsky, 1992), according to which an extended period of tranquility
and stability makes the memory of past crises fade from agents’ minds.2
The main purpose of this paper is to present a model that demonstrates how banks make
portfolio decisions and manage their balance sheet when both banks and investors, who
provide funds to the bank, are subject to local thinking. The agents in the model ignore the
state of the economy that occurs with the lowest probability, which is usually the worst–case
scenario. As a consequence, both banks and investors are overly optimistic. Banks switch
their portfolio composition more toward risky assets and away from liquid reserves, while
investors are willing to fund the banks’ risky investment strategy with their deposits.
During normal periods, banks’ risky portfolio choices and illiquid balance sheet positions
proceed without interruption, and so too do the investors’ decisions to hold the liabilities of
these banks. When local thinking agents observe bad news, however, they abruptly revise
downward their evaluations about their risky investments. As a consequence, depending
on the severity of the news, investors may run on the banks. The banks cannot fully accommodate the withdrawal demand since the bank’s liquidity holding is characteristically
insufficient.
Consequently, the bank has to liquidate its assets even at fire sale prices in order to
obtain liquidity to meet the demand for withdrawals. Banks that survived the bad news
or that are protected by the government backstop appear as potential buyers in the asset
market. However, since these surviving banks are also local thinkers, the bad news negatively
affects them as well, by devaluing their assets and thus weakening their balance sheet status.
Therefore, the demand for the distressed assets can be weak due to liquidity shortages. As
a consequence, an asset price depreciation follows.
Based on this narrative, our model derives several interesting analytical results regarding
the relationship between bank liquidity, bank runs, and fire sales. First, the optimal liquidity
holding of a local thinking bank is negatively correlated with the degree to which the bank
overvalues its risky investment by neglecting tail risks. It follows as a corollary that a local
2
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thinking bank tends to hold a smaller amount of liquid assets than a bank with rational
expectations. We also derive the condition for a bank run to take place under local thinking.
The result turns out to be quite intuitive; a bank run will occur when the bank’s expected
payoff, after the bad news, is smaller than its debt obligations to its creditors. What is more
important is that the amount of optimal liquidity of the local thinking bank is such that
when the bank experiences a run, it suffers from liquidity shortage and hence is forced to
liquidate its assets possibly in a fire sale.
In this context, we identify two channels through which local thinking behavior affects
fire sale asset prices. For this, we follow Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) in explaining the
illiquidity of a risky asset with long–term maturity by limited pledgeability. That is, due
to moral hazard at the bank level, some portion of the bank’s future cash flow has to be
promised to a bank manager in order to guarantee that she exerts effort in monitoring the
performance of the risky asset. Hence, not all the future cash flow, but only part of it, can
be pledged to raise extra funds in capital markets. In this circumstance, the local thinking
behavior affects asset prices through lowering the availability of liquidity in the asset market
first by lowering the expected future cash flow of the bank that survived the bad news and,
second by lowering the share of the bank’s expected future cash flow that can be pledged
for borrowing. This result is similar to Acharya et al. (2011), where only the first channel is
identified.
Further, in comparison to the related literature that in many cases features homogeneous
banks and homogeneous risky assets, our model introduces heterogeneity in the banking
system and the risky asset class. As a first approximation, we assume two different types
of banks — one with government insurance and the other without it — and two different
types of risky assets with different risk–return profiles; each type of bank investing only in a
single type of risky asset. This setting allows us to distinguish between the case where the
two risky assets’ returns exhibit a weak or no correlation and the case where they exhibit a
strong correlation. When the asset returns are weakly correlated, the bad news affects only
a single type of risky asset, and if that turns out to be the asset purchased by the banks
without government protection, those banks can possibly experience a run and be forced to
4

liquidate assets in a fire sale; the other banks that survived the bad news become potential
buyers of the distressed assets.
On the other hand, when the asset returns are strongly positively correlated via, for
instance, securitization, the bad news will most probably affect both types of risky assets
through contagious spread of underlying assets’ risks to asset–backed securities. In this case,
the financial position of both types of banks deteriorates to the extent that the conditions
for a bank run are met. However, it is only those banks without public backstop that are
forced to sell their assets even at a fire sale price. Nonetheless, the banks that survive the
bad news due to the protection from the government insurance will be reluctant to bid for
the liquidated asset and take on risks, since their balance sheets are also affected by the bad
news to a degree similar to the distressed banks.
This leads us to explore asset purchases by the government as an outside buyer that
uses the balance sheet of the central bank to prop up the asset market. As a result, the
size of the central bank balance sheet exhibits a sudden increase, followed by an asset price
appreciation. We consider the case where, when it injects public liquidity through an asset
purchase program, the government sets an asset price target. Since the target is set according
to a policy agenda for the broader economy, it is possible that the asset price target deviates
from the fundamental value.
Along this line of thinking, we derive the volume of the public liquidity injection required
to stabilize the asset price around the exogenously given target. The results of the model
show that, in times of stress, more public liquidity is required to achieve the asset price
target when the number of banks that operate without government protection is larger and
when the liquidity preference of the surviving banks is stronger. In particular, the same is
true when the local thinking effect is stronger, i.e. when the market tends to overvalue the
assets by ignoring the worst–possible scenarios.
Our paper contributes to the literature on bank runs and fire sales by exploring these
issues under Gennaioli et al. (2012)’s model of local thinking. First, in the existing literature,
bank runs occur either due to coordination problems among depositors (see, e.g., Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) and Rochet and Vives (2004)) or due to asymmetric information among
5

depositors concerning bank fundamentals (see, e.g., Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988)).3 While these factors can be made compatible with banking
crises in our paper, the bank run modeled below is triggered first and foremost by the fact
that depositors as well as banks are local thinkers. All of these papers, including our own,
have some form of bounded rationality at the heart of the explanation of bank runs. And
the fact that a bank run may or may not occur in our model is similar to the multiple equilibria result of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, whereas the latter result depends on
depositors’ confidence, which determines whether they will panic or not, in our model that
depends on how damaging the neglected tail risks turn out to be after the bad news, which
in turn ultimately depends on the true risk–return profile of bank assets.
Second, Shleifer and Vishny (2011) provide an extensive literature review on fire sales.
One of the important themes in the literature related to our paper is whether a buyer of
distressed assets is an insider or an outsider. (see Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Williamson
(1988)). In the case of an industry–wide averse shock with inside potential buyers being also
under stress, assets of a distressed firm will have to be sold to outside buyers, i.e. firms from
other industries, which lack technology to use the distressed assets in their best use; hence
the asset value is driven down. Whereas most of the papers in this strand of the literature
focus on asset liquidation by nonfinancial firms, our paper examines asset liquidation by
banks.
Acharya et al. (2011) is closely related to our paper. Both papers deal with bank asset
liquidation and, particularly, adopt decreasing returns to scale for risky asset returns. Our
paper is differentiated in the reason banks hold liquidity. Acharya et al. (2011), on the one
hand, focuses on the ‘strategic’ motive of obtaining capital gains by buying distressed assets
at a price below their value when an opportunity arises. In this way, the authors show that
bank liquidity is counter–cyclical.
However, while banks acquiring other distressed banks were widely observed during the
recent crisis, it was also the case that banks were reluctant to take on further risks by buying
3
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distressed assets as well as taking over the banks that owned them, which prompted the government numerous government interventions.4 Recent empirical studies such as Berrospide
(2012), Mutu and Corovei (2013), Acharya and Merrouche (2013) show that the rise in banking sector liquid assets during the recent financial crisis was mainly driven by a precautionary
motive. That during the 2007–2009 financial meltdown the banks turned risk–averse, rather
than seeking strategic gains, is also consistent with the above–mentioned theme from the
corporate finance literature on an industry–wide adverse shock, which puts a wider pool of
firms in stress; i.e., even if some firms survived the shock, they would be reluctant to purchase failed firms’ assets. For this reason, instead of the strategic motive for banks’ holding
liquidity, we focus on the precautionary motive. And we show that when local thinking banks
hold liquidity mainly to remain solvent and to protect themselves from liquidity shocks, their
liquidity holding is smaller than the liquidity holdings of banks with rational expectations.
Local thinking behavior contributes to asset price depreciation in fire sales by affecting the
balance sheets of both liquidating banks and surviving banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic setup of the
model with asset weakly correlated or uncorrelated asset returns. Section 3 introduces local
thinking framework. In section 4, optimal bank liquidity is derived and in section 5, the bank
run condition is derived. Section 6 analyzes the market for assets of distressed banks, from
which the fire sale asset price is obtained. In section 7, we extend the model to include asset
return correlation via securitization and explore the government’s asset purchase program,
that uses the central bank’s balance sheet. Section 4 concludes.

2

Basic setup

Consider a three–period economy: t = 0, 1, 2. There are two types of risky assets which,
when invested in at t = 0, mature at t = 2 yielding a stochastic return yij with probability
πij , where i ∈ {1, 2} indicates asset types and j indicates three contingent states of the
4
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economy at t = 2. There are three states: growth, downturn, and recession indicated by
j ∈ {g(growth), d(downturn), r(recession)}. We assume:
Assumption 1 ygi > 1 > yid > yir , πig > πid > πir , E(yi ) > 1 i = 1, 2
where E is an expectation operator; E(yi ) = πig yig + πid yid + πir yir . The risky asset earns
a positive rate of return if the economy grows, a negative rate of return if the economy
experiences a downturn, and an even more negative rate of return in the case of a recession.
The economy has the highest probability of experiencing growth and the lowest probability
of experiencing a recession.
There are a continuum of risk–neutral banks of measure one, each of them obtaining one
unit deposit from investors. A fraction of the total banks are type 1 banks, hence denoted by
subscript 1 and invest in type 1 risky asset, while the rest are type 2 banks, hence denoted
by subscript 2 and investing in type 2 risky asset. Let us denote the fraction of type 2 banks
by n; then the fraction of type 1 banks is 1 − n. Type 1 bank’s deposit account is protected
by government insurance, but this is not the case for type 2 banks.
There are a continuum of investors of measure one, each investor having sufficient initial
endowments. In contrast to the banks, the investors are infinitely risk–averse and have
no screening, monitoring, or loan collecting technologies, as the banks do. Therefore, the
investors invest only in bank liabilities, that pay off a non–stochastic return. When deposited
at type i bank from t = 0 to t = 2, an investor earns the riskless return of qi , for which we
adopt the following assumptions.
Assumption 2 1< qi <E(yi ), q1 < q2
The last inequality reflects risk–return trade-off; i.e. type 2 bank’s liability is considered
riskier than type 1 bank’s liability since it is not guaranteed by the public backstop in
contrast to the type 1 bank’s.
This setting of each type of banks investing on a distinctive type of risky asset can be
viewed as each bank–type specializing in a specific industry. In order to further simplify the
analysis, we assume each bank is a local monopolist and hence the investors have no choice
but simply deposit their funds at the monopolist bank in the neighborhood. This simplifies
8

the analysis of the investor’s decision–making without affecting the model results. On the
other hand, the investors can also withdraw their deposits at t = 1 but with zero rate of
return. So the investors withdraw only when they are hit by a liquidity shock, which occurs
with probability θ as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Due to the law of large numbers, θ
can be considered the number of investors hit by the liquidity shock.
Using the deposit funds, the banks at t = 0 make a portfolio choice between the risky
asset, denoted by a, and liquid reserves, denoted by l; hence type i bank’s portfolio being
(ai , li ) where ai = 1 − li . We assume the risky asset’s return has decreasing returns to scale.
In order to obtain closed form solutions, we follow Acharya et al. (2011) in adopting a specific
functional form similar to that used in Holmstrom and Tirole (2001): eqrefdiminishing return
to scale
yij = bji −

ai
2

(1)

From this specification the lower and upper bound of the risky asset’s return can be identified;
yij ∈ [bji − 12 , bji ]. That is, bji can be interpreted as an upper bound of yij . Therefore, bi has
the same probability distribution as that of yi stated in assumption 1.
By taking the expectation operator on (1), E(yi ) can be rewritten as
E(yi ) = E(bi ) −

ai
2

(2)

which clarifies that risks in yi to be associated with risks in its upper bound. In this context,
expectations about the risky assets’ returns are actually expectations about their upper
bound. On the other hand, the risky asset return profile given in assumption 1 along with
yij ∈ [bji − 12 , bji ] implies that the lower bound of yig is larger than one, which therefore yields
bgi > 23 , and the upper bound of yid and yir are smaller than one, i.e. bdi < 1 and bri < 1,
with bdi > bri . Figure 1 displays the resulting value of the risky asset return as a function of
liquidity holding.
After portfolio decisions by investors and banks are made, a signal s ∈ {s, s̄} of the
payoff yi arrives in financial markets at t = 1. It is an aggregate, systemic signal that
conveys news about both types of risky assets. The signal can be either good news s̄ or bad
news s about yi . In particular, since it is a bank that invests on the risky asset, the signal is
9

Figure 1: The risky asset return with decreasing returns to scale.
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the case of bad news, the expected value of yi could be too low for the bank to even return
the principal to depositors, in which case the latter would be better–off withdrawing their
deposits. Accordingly, by observing the signal, the depositors decide whether to run on the
bank or not.
Depending on the signal and the given return profile, some banks may experience a run
and thus are forced to liquidate their assets even at a fire sale price, while the others may
not. The surviving banks become potential bidders for the assets liquidated by the failed
banks. Since type 1 banks are protected by government insurance while type 2 banks are
not, it will be type 2 banks that may experience a run, in which case it will be type 1 banks
that come as a buyer in the asset market.
The timing of the model is illustrated in figure 2
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Figure 2: Timing of the model
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The model of local thinking

In characterizing the agent’s formation of expectations about risky asset returns as well as
the signal that affects the reassessment of asset return expectations, we adopt the model
of local thinking presented in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010). As an alternative to rational
expectations, the local thinking framework highlights judgment biases due to limited ability
in forming true representations of reality. The key idea is that when agents form a statistical
expectation, not all possible states of the world, but only a selected subset of them, come to
mind. The selection is made according to the true probabilities of the events. That is, the
states with higher probability are more likely to be represented in the agent’s inference than
the states with lower probability.
More specifically, we follow Gennaioli et al. (2012) in modeling local thinking by supposing
that out of the state space, j = {g, d, r}, of a risky asset’s payoff, only two most likely states
are represented in the agent’s mind, while the remaining state is neglected. Then the agent
forms an expectation about the risky assets’ returns, conditioned on the two selected states.
That is, facing an uncertainty, a local thinker forms a conditional expectation, neglecting the
least likely case which is usually the worst–possible scenario. This is in contrast to an agent
with rational expectation who forms an expectation by considering the entire state space.
For instance, consider a local thinker who, at t = 0, forms expectations about the uncertain future concerning the returns of the risky assets. Due to assumption 1, where we have
πig > πid > πir , only the states g and d are represented in the agent’s mind while the state r
is ignored. And in place of the true probability of g and d, i.e. πig and πid , the probability
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distribution represented in the local thinker’s mind is as follows:
πig
πig + πid
πd
PrL (yid ) = Pr(yid |yig , yid ) = g i d
π i + πi
PrL (yig ) = Pr(yig |yig , yid ) =

(3)

PrL (yir ) = Pr(yir |yig , yid ) = 0
where the superscript L denotes local thinking. In comparison to the true probability distribution, πig > πid > πir , the probability of growth and that of downturn are overestimated, while the possibility of a recession is ignored; i.e. PrL (yig ) > πig , PrL (yid ) > πid , and
PrL (yir ) = 0.
Accordingly, the local thinker’s expectation about the risky asset’s return is formed as
EL (yi ) = PrL (yig )yig + PrL (yid )yid

(4)

which contrasts with the one formed by rational expectations, E(yi ) = πig yig + πid yid + πir yir .
It can be easily verified that EL (yi ) > E(yi ). That is, the local thinker tends to exaggerate
the expected return of the risky assets in comparison to the true expectations of rational
thinkers.
Suppose that the probability distribution of the risky assets’ return and, possibly, its
order changes when a signal arrives at t = 1. In this case, the local thinker revises her
representation of the state of the world accordingly. The states which are now represented
in the agent’s mind depends on the new probability distribution established after the signal,
i.e. πij (s) = Pr(yij |s) for j = g, d, r. We assume, on the one hand,
Assumption 3 πig (s̄) > πid (s̄) > πir (s̄), i = 1, 2.
which implies that the good news s̄ does not modify the original probability distribution
reflected in assumption 1, and hence confirms the local thinker’s initial inference about the
future. In this case, the status quo continues uninterrupted.
The bad signal s, on the other hand, is assumed to modify the probability distribution
of yij . In order to specify this process, s is characterized in the following way.
Pr(s|yig ) = 1 − γi ,

Pr(s|yid ) = δi ,
12

Pr(s|yir ) = ρi ,

i = 1, 2

(5)

where ρi > δi > γi ≥ 1/2. That is, the bad signal, s, is most likely to arrive in the case
of a recession and is least likely to arrive in the case of growth; s more strongly signals a
recession than a downturn as reflected in ρi > δi , while it reduces the probability of growth
as reflected in Pr(s|yig ) ≤ 1/2.5 In this regard, we assume s reverses the order between the
probabilities of downturn and recession, while the probability of growth is not changed, i.e.
πig (s) > πir (s) > πid (s), i = 1, 2.

(6)

This will be the case as long as the following assumption is adopted.
πd

Assumption 4 ρi > ρ̂i = δi πir ,

i = 1, 2

i

which is easily satisfied if πid and πir are sufficiently close to each other and we assume that
they are.
With the probability distribution changed as in (6), the possibility of downturn drops out
of a local thinker’s mind and is replaced by that of recession in the local thinker’s expectation
formation. In this regard, we have
EL (yi |s) = yig πig (s) + yir πir (s)

(7)

which compares to the local thinking expectation before the signal in (4). We assume the
return profile and probability distribution before and after the signal in assumptions 1 and
3 are such that EL (yi |s) < EL (yi ) holds.
Lastly, as noted earlier, under the assumption of diminishing return to scale specified in
(1) expectations about yi are actually expectations about its upper bound bi as shown in
equation (2). This continues to hold even after the signal. Accordingly, EL (yi ) in the case
of a bad signal at t = 1 can also be expressed as
1
EL (yi |s) = EL (bi |s) − (1 − li )
2

(8)

EL (bi |s) = bgi πig (s) + bri πir (s)

(9)

where

with EL (bi |s) < EL (bi )
5

Note that ρi ≈ 1/2 implies that the signal is scarcely informative.
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4

Banks’ liquidity choice at t = 0

At t = 0, while the investors simply deposit a fixed amount of funds at the local monopolist
bank in their neighborhood, the banks make a portfolio decision, between liquid and risky
assets. First of all, the bank’s demand for liquidity consists of two components. First is
the liquidity holding to meet the withdrawal demand at t = 1 by the depositors hit by a
liquidity shock; this is θ, the liquidity required for solvency at t = 1. In addition, the bank
may hold extra liquidity that can be tapped when the expected return from the risky asset
is smaller than what it promised to pay to the remaining depositors at t = 2, i.e. when
(1 − θ)qi > (1 − li )EL (yi ) in the case of type i banks. Accordingly, the extra liquidity type i
banks need to hold to make up this difference is
(1 − θ)qi − (1 − li )ELi (yi ) > 0

(10)

which is the liquidity required for solvency at t = 2 when ELi (yi ) is sufficiently low, i.e.
ELi (yi ) <

(1−θ)qi
,
1−li

such that the bank cannot meet the debt contract with their depositors. In

all, the sum of the two components is the minimum total liquidity holding of type i banks
at t = 0; hence,
li > θ + (1 − θ)qi − (1 − li )ELi (yi )

(11)

Consider, on the other hand, that ELi (yi ) is sufficiently large so that the return from
the risky asset is expected to be larger than the bank’s debt obligations to its remaining
depositors at t = 2; that is, (1 − θ)qi < (1 − li )ELi (yi ). In this case, i.e. when ELi (yi ) >

(1−θ)qi
,
1−li

it is only the first component that consists of the minimum liquidity holding of type i bank
at t = 0; hence,
li > θ

(12)

In sum, type i bank’s liquidity holding at t = 0 for any possible level of EL (yi ) can be
expressed as
li > Max[θ, θ + (1 − θ)qi − (1 − li )EL (yi )]

(13)

Now, since a bank is risk–neutral, it maximizes payoff at t = 2 subject to the condition
of expected solvency expressed in (13), which guarantees solvency for any value of EL (yi ).
14

Type i bank’s payoff at t = 2 consists of its liquidity holding at t = 0 and the returns from
the risky asset at t = 2 minus the withdrawn funds of its depositors hit by a liquidity shock
at t = 1 and what it pays out to the remaining depositors at t = 2. Denoting type i bank’s
payoff at t = 2 by πi , which is a function of li , the bank’s optimization problem is as follows.
max
li

πi (li ) = li + (1 − li )EL (yi ) − θ − (1 − θ)qi
(14)

s.t. li > M ax[θ, θ + (1 − θ)qi − (1 −

li )ELi (yi )]

The solution for the above system is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Optimal bank liquidity) li∗ = 1 − (EL (bi ) − 1), i = 1, 2
Two things stand out about lemma 1. First, due to assumption 1 along with the fact that
bi is an upper bound of yi , it can be easily shown that
Corollary 1 0 < li∗ < 1
That is, the optimizing local thinking bank allocates some of the deposit funds to liquidity.
Second, the bank’s optimal liquidity holding is a negative function of its local thinking
expectation about the risky asset return, or, more precisely, about its upper bound.
Since the risky assets’ returns and hence their expected values are a function of bank
liquidity due to the assumption of diminishing returns to scale, the result in lemma 1 can be
substituted to equations (2) and (8) in obtaining the expected return of risky assets in the
case of optimal bank liquidity before and after the bad signal, respectively:

1 L
E (bi ) + 1
2

1
EL (yi |s) = EL (bi |s) + 1
2

EL (yi ) =

(15)

Equations in (15) simply describe the relation between the risky asset’s return and its upper
bound and that it is positive.
As a comparison, consider a rational bank, which operates under the exact same conditions as those of a local thinking bank expect that it is not subject to local thinking. Then
∗
the optimal liquidity holding, denoted by lRi
, of a type i rational bank can be derived in a
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way similar to the local thinking banks’ cases. Then, the rational bank’s optimal liquidity is
∗
= 1 − (E(bi ) − 1). Notice that E(bi ) is the expected value of bi under rational
obtained as lRi

expectations. Since local thinking neglects tail risks, it holds that E(bi ) < EL (bi ). Consequently, we can directly compare the optimal liquidity between the local thinking banks and
the banks with rational expectation as follows.
∗
Corollary 2 li∗ < lRi

The main reason why a local thinking bank tends to hold less liquidity than a rational
bank is because it neglects the worst–possible case scenario of the risky assets’ return and
thereby its expectations about the latter tends to be exaggerated, which in turn leads to a
portfolio decision more towards the risky assets. A more general implication of corollary 2
is that financial markets that are governed by local thinking would tend to be less liquid,
which makes them more fragile.

5

Bank run at t = 1

At an intermediate period t = 1, agents observe a signal and when it turns out that the bank
is expected to fail to meet its debt obligations, the investors run in order to be the first in
line to withdraw their deposits. Some of the investors are also hit by a liquidity shock and
hence they will liquidate their deposit accounts anyway.
When the signal is good news, the agents’ initial inferences about the return of risky
assets are confirmed. The portfolio and investment decisions made at t = 0 carry over to
the subsequent periods without disruption. Contrarily, things are different when the signal
is bad news. First of all, depositors may or may not run on their banks depending on the
expected return of the risky assets of the bank, revised down due to the bad signal. When it
is so low that the total revenues of the bank at t = 2 is not expected to be large enough to
pay even a unit return to its depositors, the depositors would be better–off if they liquidate
their deposits early. The condition for this to take place is
li − θ + (1 − li )EL (yi |s) < 1 − θ
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(16)

which can be rearranged into ELi (yi |s) < 1, which in turn is equivalent to, using (15),
EL (bi |s) < 1

(17)

Inequality (17) is the condition for a run against type i bank. The result is very intuitive as
it states that depositors will run on the bank when the expected return of bank asset in the
case of bad news is smaller than unity, which is what they deposited at the bank.
But recall that type 1 bank’s liability is backed by government insurance and therefore
even when the bank run condition is met, a run on type 1 bank will not occur. Lemma 2
summarizes the condition for a run on type 1 and type 2 banks.
Lemma 2 (Bank run) It is optimal for depositors at type i banks without public backstop
to withdraw early in the case of EL (bi |s) < 1.
Once the bank run takes place, the amount of liquidity the bank needs is 1 − θ since all of
the remaining depositors, who weren’t hit by the liquidity shock at t = 1, will withdraw. On
the other hand, the actual liquidity holding of the bank at t = 1, after having accommodated
the withdrawal demand of those depositors hit by the liquidity shock, is li∗ −θ. The difference
between the two is the bank’s liquidity shortage at t = 1 in the case of a run:
1 − θ − (li∗ − θ) > 0

(18)

The inequality is due to corollary 1. By implication, when the bank experiences a run, it
will surely suffer from a liquidity shortage; the bank cannot accommodate the withdrawal
demand of its depositors and hence is forced to liquidate its assets even at a fire sale price.
Corollary 3 The liquidity of type i bank at t = 1 is smaller than what the bank might need
when it experiences a run. That is, when hit by a run at t = 1, the liquidity shortage of each
bank is positive; 1 − θ − (li∗ − θ) > 0.
In fact, the liquidity shortage problem in the case of a bank run is not unique for a local
∗
thinking bank but a rational bank is also vulnerable as long as 0 < lR
< 1, which can be

easily shown in the same way as the case for the local thinking bank. That is, while the
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bank run and the subsequent liquidity crisis take place due to local thinking, the liquidity
crisis leading to solvency crisis does not stem from local thinking but from the standard
banking of borrow short lend long and consequent maturity mismatch between assets and
liabilities in bank balance sheet. However, corollary 2 implies that the liquidity shortage
problem will be more intense with a local thinking bank than with a rational bank, i.e.
∗
− θ), which makes financial markets populated by local thinking
1 − θ − (li∗ − θ) > 1 − θ − (lR

agents more vulnerable to a shock compared to a market guided by rational expectations.
Regarding the bank run condition in lemma 2, there are four possible scenarios as displayed in table 1. Remember that EL (bi ) >EL (bi |s) in all cases, that is, investors revise down
the expectations about the return of risky assets in response to bad news. Depending on
the severity of the revision, the bank run condition may or may not be met. Case I is the
scenario where the expected returns of both types of risky assets fall only by a small degree
so that the bank run condition is met for neither type of bank, while in case IV the fall of the
expected returns of both types of risky asset is sufficiently large that the bank run condition
is met for both types of bank. These cases represent a scenario where the returns of both
types of risky asset are strongly positively correlated with each other so that in response to
bad news at t = 1 they tend to fall by the same degree.
On the other hand, cases II and III are the scenarios where the expected return of one
type of risky asset falls so strongly that the bank run condition is met for the bank, while
the fall for the other type of risky asset is weak enough to avoid the bank run condition.
Cases II and III represent scenarios where the returns of both types of risky asset are weakly
positively correlated with each other so that in response to bad news at t = 1 they tend to
fall by a different degree.
Another consideration is that even when the bank run condition is met for type 1 risky
asset, type 1 banks do not experience a run due to the public backstop; only type 2 banks
are vulnerable to a bank run. For this reason, we exclude cases I and III as an uninteresting
scenarios and, in the rest of the paper, focus on cases II and IV in turn. In both cases, it
is only type 2 banks that experience a run and hence, due to corollary 3, have to liquidate
their assets.
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Table 1: Four scenarios concerning a run on the banking sector in case of s

EL (b2 |s) ≥ 1

EL (b2 |s) < 1

EL (b1 |s) ≥ 1

Case I. No bank run

Case II. Run on type 2 bank

EL (b1 |s) < 1

Case III. No bank run

Case IV. Run on type 2 bank

The difference is that in case II (weak asset correlation), as the effect of the bad signal
is not so severe as to satisfy the bank run condition for type 1 bank, the bank’s balance
sheet status is still solid and therefore the bank can possibly become a potential buyer in
the asset market. In contrast, in case IV (strong asset correlation), the effect of the bad
signal is sufficiently severe for type 1 banks that they also experience a substantial reduction
in the expected return of their assets but nonetheless avoid a run only because of the help
of government insurance. Therefore, although they survived, type 1 banks experience a
weakening of their balance sheets that make them reluctant to further assume risks by
purchasing type 2 banks’ distressed assets.

6

Asset market at t = 1

Let us first consider case II (weak asset correlation) where the bank run condition is met
only for type 2 banks and therefore it is only type 2 banks that experience a run due to
corollary 3. The bank is forced to liquidate its assets even at a fire sale discount. Suppose,
since the type 1 bank survives bad news, it bids for the distressed assets of type 2 banks in
the asset market.
There are two sources of funds for type 1 banks for asset purchases. First is the liquidity
left over after having accommodated the withdrawal demand by its depositors hit by the
liquidity shock at t = 1. Second, the bank can also raise extra funds in the capital market
by pledging its future cash flows at t = 2. However, due to a moral hazard problem existing between the bank owner and the bank manager, the pledgeability is always limited
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). That is, not all the future cash flows can be pledged since
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some portion of it has to be provided to the bank manager as an incentive to exert effort to
monitor the performance of the risky asset. This is what makes risky assets not completely
liquid. Let us see this more closely.

Limited pledgeability. Suppose that if the manager of a type 1 bank does not exert effort,
the expected return of the bank’s risky asset will decrease to EL (y1 ) −  from EL (y1 ), while
the manager enjoys a benefit of c ∈ (0, ). Therefore, in order to motivate the manager
to exert effort, a share of the bank’s payoffs at t = 2 has to be promised to the bank
manager. Let us denote this share by µ. Then, the manager will exert effort only when her
payoff in the case of exerting effort is larger than the payoff in the case of no effort. Since
(1 − l1 )EL (y1 ) − (1 − θ)q1 is the future cash flows of type 1 bank when its manager exerts
effort, the incentive compatibility is
h

i

i

h

µ (1 − l1 )EL (y1 ) − (1 − θ)q1 ≥ µ (1 − l1 )(EL (y1 ) − ) − (1 − θ)q1 + c

(19)

Accordingly, the minimum share required to ensure that the manage exerts effort is µ =
c
,
(1−l1 )

which, under the optimal bank liquidity expressed in lemma 1, becomes
µ=

c
(E (b1 ) − 1)

(20)

L

It implies that the maximum share, denoted by τ , of type 1 bank’s future cash flows that
can be pledged to raise funds in the capital market is τ = 1 − µ, i.e.
τ =1−

c
(E (b1 ) − 1)

(21)

L

In comparison to the case of a local thinking bank, consider the same maximum share
of the pledgeable future cash flow for a rational bank and denote it by τR . Then, it can
be obtained in the same way as for the local thinking bank as τR = 1 −

c
.
(E(b1 )−1)

Since

EL (b1 ) > E(b1 ), we have τ > τR . The following counterintuitive lemma summarizes this
result.
Lemma 3 Financial markets populated by local thinking agents enable larger share of future
revenues to be pledged for raising funds in the capital market compared to financial markets
governed by rational expectations, i.e. τ > τR .
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The key mechanism underlying lemma (3) is that the local thinking mitigates the constraints generated by the moral hazard problem, between the owner and manager at the
bank, by lowering µ. This can be confirmed by using the expression for µ in equation (20);
denote by µR the minimum share required to ensure the bank manager to exert effort in the
case of a rational bank; since EL (b1 ) > E(b1 ), we have µ < µR . Lastly, according to lemma
(3), borrowers in the local thinking financial market tend to have larger leverage ratio and
consequently the system tends to be more fragile compared to the financial market populated
by rational agents.

Condition for the positive future cash flows. Raising additional funds from the capital
market is possible only when the future cash flows are positive in the first place. This is
the constraint type 1 bank faces when borrowing. Note that in the case of s, the expected
return of type 1 bank’s risky asset is revised down to EL (y1 |s) from EL (y1 ). Consequently,
its expected cash flow at t = 2 depreciates from (1−l1 )EL (y1 )−(1−θ)q1 to (1−l1 )EL (y1 |s)−
(1 − θ)q1 , which however can still be positive as long as EL (y1 |s) is not too low such that
EL (y1 |s) >

(1−θ)q1
1−l1

holds. This condition can be rewritten as
EL (b1 |s) >

2(1 − θ)q1
−1
EL (b1 ) − 1

(22)

which uses the expression for the optimal liquidity holding l1∗ = 2 − EL (b1 ) and (15).
The question here is whether the positive future cash flows condition, derived as in (22),
is guaranteed when the no–bank run condition, EL (b1 |s) > 1, is met.6 From the comparison
between two conditions, it is immediately obvious that it depends on whether

2(1−θ)q1

EL (b1 )−1

−1 > 1

2(1−θ)q1
− 1 6 1. Let us consider these two in turn.
EL (b1 )−1
1
− 1 > 1, which is equivalent to EL (b1 ) < (1 − θ)q1 + 1: The inequality
(a) When 2(1−θ)q
EL (b1 )−1
sets the upper bound of EL (b1 ), implying the local thinker’s expected return of type 1 risky

or

asset is sufficiently low. The case in question is displayed in figure 3a. As long as EL (b1 ) is
below the upper bound, type 1 bank’s no–bankrun condition at t = 1 does not guarantee the
positiveness of its expected future cash flows at t = 2; the no–bank run condition is a subset
6

Remember case II is being considered here.
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Figure 3: Whether the no–bank run condition, EL (b1 |s) > 1, will guarantee the positiveness of
the expected future cash flows for type 1 bank
(a) EL (b1 ) < (1 − θ)q1 + 1

No bank-run

Positive expected future cash flows

2(1 − 𝜃)𝑞1
−1
𝐸𝐿 (𝑏1 ) − 1

1

𝐸 𝐿 �𝑏1 �𝑠�

(b) EL (b1 ) > (1 − θ)q1 + 1
Positive expected future cash flows

No bank-run

2(1 − 𝜃)𝑞1
−1
𝐸𝐿 (𝑏1 ) − 1

𝐸 𝐿 �𝑏1 �𝑠�

1

of the positive future cash flows condition. That is, although the downward revision of type 1
risky asset’s expected return is not so intense as to meet the bank run condition, it is intense
enough to bring the bank’s expected future cash flows to a negative value. Accordingly, as
can be seen from figure (3a), case (a) consists of two possible subregions of EL (b1 |s) that
generate distinctive results.
2(1−θ)q1
− 1 < EL (b1 |s): EL (b1 |s) is high enough to avoid a run and have positive
EL (b1 )−1
expected future cash flows. The bank is able to raise extra capital from the market by

(a–i)

pledging its expected future cash flows.
(a–ii) 1 < EL (b1 |s) <

2(1−θ)q1

EL (b1 )−1

− 1: EL (b1 |s) is high enough for type 1 banks to avoid
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a run but is not sufficiently high to enable the bank to have positive expected future cash
flows. Therefore, when purchasing type 2 bank’s distressed assets, type 1 bank cannot raise
extra funds from the capital market but has to rely only on its own liquidity holding.
2(1−θ)q1
− 1 6 1, which is equivalent to EL (b1 ) > (1 − θ)q1 + 1. The inequality
EL (b1 )−1
sets the lower bound of EL (b1 ), implying the local thinker’s expected return of type 1 risky

(b) When

asset is sufficiently high. The case in question is illustrated in figure (3b). As long as EL (b1 ) is
above the lower bound, the condition for no bank run guarantees the positiveness of expected
future cash flows. But since we are here considering EL (b1 |s) > 1, type 1 banks in all cases
will avoid a run and have positive expected future cash flows. Accordingly, there is only one
region of EL (b1 |s) to consider, which is EL (b1 |s) > 1.
In all, case (a) is more plausible than case (b) for the following reason. Given the plausible values for q1 and θ, it is likely that (1 − θ)q1 is not far different from one;7 this renders
EL (b1 ) > (1 − θ)q1 + 1, which is case (b), an unrealistically extreme case of the local thinking
overoptimism with the expected return close to 100%. Therefore, we will consider only case
(a) below.

Fire sale asset prices. Now we examine how the price of the risky asset liquidated by
type 2 bank is determined. In doing so, we assume the condition in case (a), displayed in
figure 3a, holds, which allows the two distinctive subcases concerning whether or not the
type 1 bank is able to pledge its future cash flows, thereby obtaining extra liquidity from
the capital market in purchasing type 2 banks’ liquidated assets. Let us denote the asset
price by pA when type 1 bank can pledge its future cash flows, and denote it by pB when
the bank cannot pledge. The fundamental value, denoted by p̄, of type 2 risky asset in case
of s is p̄=EL (y2 |s) < 1.8
2(1−θ)q1
− 1: Type 1 bank’s expected future cash flows are positive,
EL (b1 )−1
which allows it to raise extra liquidity. When the signal observed at t = 1 is s, the share, τ ,

(a–i) EL (b1 |s) >

7

Remember that q1 is the return on a riskless asset, which therefore should be not far larger than one,

and θ is the probability of liquidity shock, which therefore should be not far larger than zero.
8
The inequality holds since we are considering case II; see table 1.
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of the future cash flows that is pledgeable is
c
(E (b1 |s) − 1)

τ =1−

(23)

L

which compares to τ before the signal as expressed in equation (21). Then the overall amount
of funds, denoted by M , available to type 1 bank at t = 1 for the asset purchase is
h

i

M = l1 − θ + τ (1 − l1 )EL (b1 |s) − q1 (1 − θ)

(24)

Since the number of type 1 banks is 1 − n, the total funds available for the asset purchase is
(1 − n)M .
On the other hand, the nominal value of risky assets of type 2 banks is n(1 − l2 )pA .
Considering the optimal liquidity for type 1 and type 2 bank, i.e. l1∗ and l2∗ , pA can be
obtained from the equilibrium condition in the asset market, (1 − n)M = n(1 − l2 )p, as
h

pA =

(1 − n) 2 − EL (b1 ) − θ +

τ
2



(EL (b1 ) − 1)(EL (b1 |s) + 1) − 2(1 − θ)q1

i

(25)

n(EL (b2 ) − 1)

It is optimal for type 1 banks to bid for the asset only when the asset price is set less than
or equal to its fundamental value, i.e. pA 6 p̄, in which case the expected return from the
asset purchase is

p̄−pA
.
pA

When pA > p̄, it is optimal for type 1 bank not to bid for the asset.

If the number of type 2 banks is relatively small so that a sufficiently large number of
type 1 banks bid for type 2 risky asset, the asset price will be established at the zero profit
price, i.e. pA = p̄. But if the number of type 2 banks is sufficiently large, the asset price will
be established at pA < p̄; that is, the type 2 bank has to sell its assets at a price less than
their fundamental value. Since p̄=EL (y2 |s), the threshold point of n, denoted by nA , can be
obtained by solving pA = EL (y2 |s):
nA =

2 − E L (b1 ) − θ +
1
(E L (b2 )
2

τ
2

h

(E L (b1 ) − 1)(E L (b1 |s) + 1) − 2(1 − θ)q1

− 1)(E L (b2 |s) + 1) + 2 − E L (b1 ) − θ +

τ
2

h

i

(E L (b1 ) − 1)(E L (b1 |s) + 1) − 2(1 − θ)q1
(26)

When n 6 nA , the asset can be sold at its full price, i.e. pA = p̄, while when n > nA the
asset will be sold at less than its full price, i.e. pA < p̄, which is the fire sale price. See figure
4. (a–ii) 1 < EL (b1 |s) <

2(1−θ)q1

EL (b1 )−1

− 1: EL (b1 |s) is so low that type 1 bank’s expected future
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Figure 4: Price function in proposition 1
p
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𝑝𝐴

𝑛𝐴

1

n

cash flow is not positive, in which case the bank cannot borrow and hence its own t = 1
liquidity is the only source of funds for asset purchase, i.e. M = l1 − θ. On the other hand,
the nominal value of the risky assets of type 2 banks is n(1 − l2 )pB . Considering the optimal
liquidity for type 1 and type 2 bank, i.e. l1∗ and l2∗ , the asset price, pB , can be obtained from
the equilibrium condition in the asset market, (1 − n)(l1 − θ) = n(1 − l2 )pB , as


pB =

(1 − n) 2 − EL (b1 ) − θ



n(EL (b2 ) − 1)

(27)

If the number of type 2 banks is sufficiently small, type 1 banks have to pay the full price
of the liquidated assets of type 2 banks; otherwise, the asset will be sold at less than the full
price. The associated threshold n, denoted by nB , is obtained from pB = EL (y2 |s) as
nB =

2 − E L (b1 ) − θ
1
(E L (b2 ) − 1)(E L (b2 |s) + 1) + 2 − E L (b1 ) − θ
2

(28)

That is, when n 6 nB , pB = p̄, while when n > nB , pA < p̄. See figure 4.
The results discussed so far regarding the asset price of case II as a function of the number
of failed banks is summarized in proposition 1 and is displayed in figure 5 as well as figure 4.
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Proposition 1 The price of type 2 banks’ liquidated assets are determined in the following
way.
2(1−θ)q1
− 1 so that a type 1 bank can pledge its future cash flow and raise
EL (b1 )−1
additional funds from the capital market for purchasing the asset,

(i) If EL (b1 |s) >

pA =








f or n 6 nA

p̄


i
h
τ
L
L
L
(E
(b
)
−
1)(E
(b
|s)
+
1)
−
2(1
−
θ)q
(1
−
n)
2
−
E
(b
)
−
θ
+

1
1
1
1

2



L

n(E (b2 ) − 1)

f or n > nA

2(1−θ)q1
− 1 so that a type 1 bank cannot pledge its future cash flow and
EL (b1 )−1
therefore has to rely on its own liquidity for purchasing the asset,

(ii) If EL (b1 |s) 6

pB =








p̄

f or



L
(1
−
n)
2
−
E
(b
)
−
θ

1




L

n(E (b2 ) − 1)

f or

n 6 nB
n > nB

The fourth term in the square bracket in the numerator of pA is type 1 bank’s external
funds raised in the capital market — hence, strictly positive — remembering that τ is the
pledgeable share of the bank’s future cash flows while the future cash flow itself is expressed
by the rest of the fourth term. It can be seen that this term does not exist in the expression
for pB because pB is the asset price corresponding to the situation where type 1 banks cannot
raise funds from the capital market. Consequently, we can easily confirm that pA > pB and
nA > nB ; verify that τ = 0 leads to pA = pB and nA = nB
Concerning case II —E L (b1 |s) > 1 and E L (b2 |s) < 1 — as analyzed so far, there are two
channels through which the local thinking affects the asset price. First, in response to a bad
signal, the expected return of type 2 bank’s risky asset is revised significantly downward so
that the bank experiences a run and hence is forced to liquidate its assets. Second, while the
downward revision of the expected return of type 1 bank’s risky asset is not so significant as
to subject the bank to a run, it still has a negative impact on the bank’s borrowing capacity;
when the revised expected return of the risky asset is lower, the extra liquidity the bank
can raise in the capital market becomes smaller, or in an extreme case it cannot borrow at
all; in any case, the asset market will suffer from a liquidity shortage. In sum, once type 2
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Figure 5: Conditions of a bank run and determination of fire sale asset prices under local thinking

Type 2 bank

Type 1 bank

Bank-run:

No bank-run: E𝐿 �𝑏1�𝑠� > 1

E 𝐿 �𝑏2 �𝑠� < 1

Pledgeable:

Non-pledgeable:
E 𝐿 �𝑏1 �𝑠� ≤

2(1−𝜃)𝑞1
E𝐿 (𝑏1 )−1

−1
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E𝐿 (𝑏1 )−1
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−1
E 𝐿 (𝑏1 ) − 1

1

𝑝𝐵
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𝑝̅

1

−1

E 𝐿 �𝑏𝑖 �𝑠�

𝑝

banks are forced to liquidate their assets, local thinking exerts downward pressure on the
asset price by weakening type 1 bank’s borrowing capacity.
In order to see this distinct local thinking effect on the asset price formally, we can
conduct a comparative static analysis of pA with respect to EL (b1 |s). One caveat is that the
comparative statics needs to be performed carefully considering that EL (b1 |s) is endogenous
to EL (b1 ). For clarification, let us first reproduce the expressions for EL (b1 ) and EL (b1 |s):
EL (b1 ) = bg PrL (bg ) + bd PrL (bd )
EL (b1 |s) = bg PrL (bg ) + br PrL (br )
Remember that EL (b1 ) is measured with the worst–possible case scenario, a recession, neglected. Thus when the neglected risk turns out to be a more severe one, i.e. br being lower,
the revised expectation about the risky asset after the bad signal will be weaker and therefore
EL (b1 |s) will be smaller, while the expectation before the signal, i.e. EL (b1 ), remains the
same. This is what we have in mind when conducting the comparative static analysis of pA
with respect to EL (b1 |s).
By examining the expression of pA in proposition 1 and that of τ in (23), it can be easily
verified that EL (b1 |s) affects the asset price in two ways. First, the lower the EL (b1 |s), the
smaller the type 1 bank’s expected future cash flow; let the latter be denoted by C, then we
have

∂C
∂EL (b1 |s)

> 0. Second, the lower the EL (b1 |s), the smaller the share of the pledgeable

future cash flows of type 1 banks;

∂τ
∂EL (b1 |s)

> 0. In both cases, a decrease in EL (b1 |s) due to

a lower br undermines type 1 bank’s borrowing capacity. This result on the impact of the
severity of the local thinking effect on the asset price is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 4 In the case of a bad signal s, when the worst–possible case scenario neglected
by the local thinking agent turns out to be worse, as reflected in a lower br and consequently
in lower EL (b1 |s), it will make the asset price lower, making the fire sale worse, in two ways:
(i) By reducing the bidding bank’s expected future cash flows, i.e.

∂C
L

∂ E (b1 |s)

> 0, where

C = 21 (E L (b1 ) − 1)(E L (b1 |s) + 1) − (1 − θ)q1 , the expected future cash flows;
(ii) by reducing the share, τ , of the bidding bank’s expected future cash flow, that can be
pledged in the capital market for borrowing, i.e.
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∂τ
L

∂ E (b1 |s)

> 0.

In sum, a lower E L (b1 |s) due to a lower br leads to a lower pA through the two mechanisms
2(1−θ)q1
− 1, at which point
EL (b1 )−1
type 1 bank’s expected future cash flow is zero, the asset price is established at pB .

described in corollary 4; once E L (b1 |s) is lowered all the way to

7

Asset returns correlation

The benchmark model analyzed thus far especially in the previous section has focused on
case II where the two risky assets are weakly correlated so that bad news significantly brings
down the expected return of type 2 risky asset while the downward revision of type 1 risky
asset’s expected return is only mild. Consequently, type 1 banks survive the bad signal and
hence bid for the distressed assets of type 2 banks. Now, let us consider case IV where
the two risky assets are strongly correlated with each other such that in the case of a bad
signal type 1 risky asset’s expected return is also severely affected. In this case it is reluctant
to purchase the distressed assets even though it does not experience a run thanks to the
government protection.
A possible institutional setting for the strong asset returns correlation is securitization of
bank assets. A type 1 bank, instead of keeping type 1 risky assets on its balance sheet, now
packages and unloads them to an off–balance sheet entity such as a special purpose vehicle
(SPV); the SPV issues asset–backed securities (ABS) in order to finance its holdings of type
1 risky asset bundles; it is type 2 banks that buy the ABSs. In comparison to the benchmark
model, type 2 risky asset is now replaced by the ABS as an investment vehicle for type 2
banks.9 The balance sheet schema of the securitization is demonstrated in figure 6.
Although type 1 bank unloads the risky asset to the SPV, it continues to be the entity
that collects earnings from type 1 risky asset, but it passes them through to the SPV.
Therefore, the SPV’s payoff at t = 2 is y1 , which is the return of type 1 risky asset. On the
other hand, since the SPV obtains funds by issuing the ABS, the return of the ABS is what
the SPV pays out to its creditor, type 2 bank. Let us denote the ABS return by yx . We
further introduce the spread between y1 and yx as the source of the SPV’s profits and denote
9

For this reason, we will replace the subscript 2 on the notations for type 2 bank by the subscript x.
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Figure 6: Securitization

it by w. Accordingly, we have yx = y1 − w and, due to assumption 1, the return profile and
probability distribution of the ABS is as follows.
yxg (= y1g − w) > 1 > yxd (= y1d − w) > yxr (= y1r − w)

and

πxg (= π1g ) > πxd (= π1d ) > πxr (= π1r )
(29)

We continue to assume the decreasing return to scale as in (1) and therefore the ABS
return can be expressed as
yx = b1 −

1 − l1
−w
2

(30)

Similar to the diminishing return to scale specification of yi in (1), the specification in (30)
defines the lower and upper bound of yx as yx ∈ [b1 −w − 12 , b1 −w], where the upper bound of
yx denoted by bx can be defined as bx = b1 − w. And the expectation of bx is easily obtained
as
E(bx ) = E(b1 ) − w

(31)

In all, the state–contingent payoffs for the ABS are smaller than those for type 1 risky
asset by w, while the probability distribution of the ABS return is the same as the probability
distribution of the return of type 1 risky asset. Denoting the variation of each asset by σi2 ,
i ∈ {1, x}, the risk–return profile of type 1 risky asset and the ABS can be compared in the
following way.
E(yx ) = E(y1 ) − w

and σx2 = σ12

(32)

While the expected return of the ABS is lower than the expected return of type 1 risky asset
by w, their variation is the same.
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In this simple setting, the two assets’ returns exhibit perfectly positive correlation, i.e.
their correlation coefficient being unity. The important point is that because of the securitization the risk involved in the underlying asset, i.e. in type 1 risky asset, is transferred to
the other asset class in the system, i.e. the ABS; thus the risks of the ABS track the risks
of type 1 risky asset.
We assume w small enough for the return of the ABS to be profitable so that type 2
banks take positive positions in ABS. For this, we adopt
Assumption 5 ω < EL (b1 ) − 1
In the case of securitization, there are two additional things to consider in comparison
to the benchmark model without securitization. First, since type 2 banks now invest in a
different asset, i.e. ABS, their liquidity holding will change. Second, type 1 banks obtain
additional liquidity as proceeds from selling part of their risky assets; note that they can
sell by the amount that matches the volume of type 2 banks’ investment on ABS. Suppose
type 1 banks use the proceeds to make additional investments in type 1 risky assets. The
question is whether it will use the entire proceeds or only part of them.
Note that a type 1 bank is making an additional investment not by issuing additional
debt but by tapping fresh liquidity additionally acquired through securitization. Also note
that the existing liquidity holding, before securitization, was determined in the first round
of portfolio decision, as discussed in the benchmark model, in a way that avoids insolvency
in the subsequent periods. Hence, one might think that although more investments are
made, no more liquidity holding is required for solvency. That would be true if the risky
asset return in t = 2 remains the same despite the additional investments, which however
is not the case due to the diminishing return to scale. As type 1 banks makes additional
investments in the type 1 risky asset, the asset return becomes lower. Hence, the existing
liquidity holding, the volume of which was determined according to the initial asset return,
becomes insufficient to guarantee solvency in t = 2. This implies that type 1 banks cannot
use all their new liquidity but only part of it in making an extra investment in type 1 risky
assets; the rest has to be held as a liquidity buffer for solvency in the subsequent periods.
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In all, when securitization and hence asset return correlation are introduced, we have
to examine type 2 bank’s portfolio decision between liquidity and ABS and type 1 bank’s
second round of portfolio decision with the fresh liquidity from securitization.

7.1

Banks’ liquidity choice at t = 0

First, type 2 bank’s liquidity choice in the case of a portfolio decision between liquidity and
ABS can be examined in the same way as in the case without securitization in the benchmark
model, which has resulted in optimal liquidity expressed in lemma 1. Using this result, the
optimal liquidity of type 2 bank and consequently its investment in ABS, each denoted by
lx and ax respectively, can be determined as
lx∗ = 1 − (EL (bx ) − 1) = 2 + w − EL (b1 )
a∗x

L

(33)

L

= E (bx ) − 1 = E (b1 ) − 1 − w

where the relation in (31) is used for the second equality in each case. Confirm that the
budget constraint lx + ax = 1 holds. Moreover, we have a∗x > 0 due to assumption 5, which
restricts profit margin for the SPV to be sufficiently small so that the investment in the ABS
is profitable.
As for type 1 banks, their first round of optimal portfolio decisions before securitization is
the same as that analyzed in the benchmark model where the resulting portfolio of the banks
was (a∗1 , l1∗ ) = (EL (b1 ) − 1, 2 − EL (b1 )). Out of the outstanding risky assets of EL (b1 ) − 1, the
bank securitizes part of them by the amount of EL (bx ) − 1, which is identical to the type 2
bank’s demand for ABS. Hence, type 1 bank’s proceeds from the securitization is EL (bx ) − 1
and the remaining risky assets in the bank balance sheet are EL (b1 ) − EL (bx ).
Next, out of the new liquidity of EL (bx ) − 1, the type 1 bank makes the second round of
optimal portfolio decisions between type 1 risky assets and liquidity, each of which is denoted
by ã1 and l˜1 , respectively. Hence, the type 1 bank’s budget constraint for the second round
of investment is
ã1 + ˜l1 = EL (bx ) − 1
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(34)

The type 1 bank’s second round of optimization problem is the same as that for its first
round of optimization problem, expressed in the system in (14), except two modifications
required. First, in place of l1 in the problem, we need to have l1∗ + ˜l1 , where the first term
is taken as given and the second term is the unknown variable in question. That is, when
the bank decides how much out of the proceeds from securitization need to be additionally
invested in the risky asset, it takes the existing liquidity holding taken as given.
Second, as for EL (yi ) in the optimization problem, we had EL (y1 ) = EL (b1 ) −

a1
2

in the

first round of portfolio decision. Note that the second term on the right–hand side captures
the effect of diminishing return to scale. As mentioned earlier, this second term will change
as type 1 banks now are able to make extra investments ion type 1 risky assets by tapping
the proceeds from securitization. Reflecting this, let us use I1 to denote total investment on
type 1 risky asset. Accordingly, the expression for EL (y1 ) is revised into
EL (y1 ) = EL (b1 ) −

I1
2

(35)

And we know that, by definition,
I1 = a∗1 + ã1 = a∗1 + EL (bx ) − 1 − ˜l1

(36)

where the second equation uses the budget constraint (34).
On the other hand, type 1 risky assets held in type 1 bank’s balance sheet is different
from I1 as some of the latter is securitized. Let us denote the outstanding balance of type 1
risky assets by A1 , which compares to a1 of the benchmark model; then we have A1 < I1 . As
mentioned earlier, the risky assets remaining on the bank balance sheet immediately after
securitization is EL (b1 ) − EL (bx ) and additional investment on type 1 risky asset using the
proceed from securitization is ã1 . Hence, the outstanding balance of type 1 risky asset is
A1 = EL (b1 ) − EL (bx ) + ã1 = EL (b1 ) − 1 − ˜l1

(37)

In all, type 1 bank’s optimization problem in the second round of portfolio decision is
max
l̃1

s.t.

π1 (˜l1 ) = l1∗ + ˜l1 + A1 EL (y1 ) − θ − (1 − θ)q1
(38)

l1∗

+ ˜l1 > M ax[θ, θ + (1 − θ)q1 − A1 EL (y1 )]
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The solution for the above optimization problem is ˜l1∗ =

1
2





EL (b1 ) − 1 − ω , which is type 1

bank’s optimal liquidity in the second round of portfolio decision after securitization. Total
liquidity holding, l1∗ + ˜l1∗ , of the type 1 bank after securitization and the second round of
portfolio decision making is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 l1∗ + ˜l1∗ =

1
2



3 − EL (b1 ) − ω



Similar to the result in lemma 1, which demonstrates the optimal liquidity of each type of
bank in the benchmark model without securitization, the total optimal liquidity that results
from the two rounds of portfolio decision in the case of securitization is negatively related
to the expected return EL (b1 ). That is, when the risky asset is expected to generate larger
return, the optimal bank liquidity will be smaller, thereby making the bank more vulnerable
to external shocks. More important, the same logic generates the optimal liquidity of a
∗
∗
=
+ ˜lR1
rational bank in the similar context of securitization to be lR1

1
2





3 − E(b1 ) − ω .

Since EL (b1 ) > E(b1 ), it can be easily shown that the total optimal liquidity of the rational
bank is larger than that of the local thinking bank; this is summarized in the following
corollary.
∗
∗
Corollary 5 l1∗ + ˜l1∗ < lR1
+ ˜lR1

which is the securitization counterpart of corollary 2.

7.2

Bank run at t = 1

The bank run condition in the benchmark model without securitization and hence no asset
return correlation is expressed in (16), which is reproduced below.
li − θ + (1 − li )EL (yi |s) < 1 − θ
remembering EL (y1 |s) = EL (b1 |s)− a21 as in (8), which reflects the diminishing return to scale.
The left–hand side is type i bank’s total payoff at t = 2 in the case of a bad signal, while
the right–hand side is the bank’s t = 2 obligations to its depositors. When securitization is
introduced, the same modifications, discussed in section 7.1, above need to be considered; a
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change in the liquidity holding li and, consequently, a change in the expected asset return
EL (yi |s) due to the diminishing returns to scale.
More specifically, as the type 1 bank now makes an additional round of portfolio decision
between the type 1 risky asset and liquidity by using the proceeds from securitization, l1
has to be replaced by l1 + ˜l1 and, consequently, as total investment in the type 1 risky asset
is now I1 = a1 + ã1 instead of simply a1 , EL (y1 |s) = EL (b1 |s) −
EL (y1 |s) = EL (b1 |s) −

I1
.
2

a1
2

has to be replaced by

Accordingly, the above–reproduced bank run condition for type 1

bank is modified into
I1
l1 + ˜l1 − θ + (1 − l1 − ˜l1 ) EL (b1 |s) −
2




<1−θ

(39)

By the same logic, since the type 2 bank now invests in ABS, not in the type 2 asset, l2
is to be replaced by lx . In addition, since the expected return of ABS is correlated to that
of the type 1 risky asset with the spread of w as noted in (32), EL (y2 |s) = EL (b2 |s) −

a2
2

is

to be replaced by EL (yx |s) = EL (y1 |s) − w. Accordingly, the above–reproduced bank run
condition for type 2 bank is modified into




lx − θ + (1 − lx ) EL (y1 |s) − w < 1 − θ

(40)

Now, by using lemmas 1 and 4 and equation (36), the bank run conditions in (39) and
(40), respectively, can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 5 In the case of asset return correlation via securitization, when bad news arrives at
t = 1, it is optimal for depositors at type 1 banks and depositors at type 2 banks, respectively,
to withdraw early in each of the following conditions.
1
3EL (b1 ) − ω + 1
4

1
EL (b1 |s) <
3EL (b1 ) + 3ω + 1
4


EL (b1 |s) <



(41)
(42)

By comparing the two inequalities in lemma 5, it can be shown that the bank run
condition for type 1 bank is a subset of the bank run condition for type 2 bank since
1
4





3EL (b1 )−ω +1 <

1
4





3EL (b1 )+3ω +1 . This observation leads to the following corollary.
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Corollary 6 If the bank run condition is met for type 1 bank — which securitizes part of
its assets — the bank run condition of type 2 bank — which purchases ABS — will also be
met.
It implies that a trouble in one asset class is spread to another asset class. A contagious
effect emerges through securitization.

7.3

Asset market at t = 1

Now, let us consider the case where the expected return of type 1 risky asset after bad news
is so low that the bank run condition, in (41), for type 1 bank is met and consequently
that for type 2 bank, expressed in (42), is also satisfied due to corollary 6. We continue to
suppose that only type 1 banks are protected by government insurance for their deposits.
Hence, although the bank run condition is satisfied for both types of banks, it will be only
type 2 banks that experience a run and are forced to liquidate their assets, the ABS, even
at a fire sale discount.
Although the type 1 bank is the one that invested in the underlying asset for the ABS,
in this simple model of two types of bank we take the type 1 bank as a bidder in the market
for the assets of the type 2 bank similarly to the benchmark model since we are continuing
to assume that type 1 bank is protected by the public guarantee and hence does not go
bankrupt. The difference from the benchmark model, however, is that it is not only the type
2 bank that is in trouble but also the type 1 bank is also severely affected by the bad signal
as its asset’s return, i.e. type 1 risky asset return, is also revised down substantially; in fact,
the trouble is originating from the type 1 bank’s balance sheet as it takes position in the
underlying asset, whose risks are spread to the other segment of the system.
Therefore, although the type 1 bank does not experience a run and hence does not go
bankrupt, its financial position is weak in case of the bad signal. In this context, it is highly
possible that the type 1 bank’s liquidity preference will be very high, being reluctant to spend
all of its liquidity in purchasing the liquidated assets, as was the case in the benchmark model,
but only a share of it. Let us denote this share by 1 − λ, where λ is a measure of the bank’s
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liquidity preference when it is hit by the bad signal shock at t = 1.
Furthermore, when the type 1 bank is using only a portion of its liquidity in bidding for
the distressed assets due to the heightened liquidity preference λ > 0, the bank is unlikely
to pledge its future cash flows to raise additional funds in the asset purchase; hence τ = 0.
In this context, the only funding source type 1 bank can tap to purchase distressed assets
is its own liquidity at t = 1 which is expressed in lemma (4). Since there are, at t = 1, θ
depositors who are hit by liquidity shocks and thus withdraw early, the liquidity eventually
available for asset purchase is l1∗ + ˜l1∗ − θ:

1
3 − EL (b1 ) − ω − θ
2

(43)

Considering the number of type 1 banks n and their liquidity preference λ, total volume of
funds used for asset purchase is
M = (1 − n)(1 − λ)

h1

2



3 − EL (b1 ) − ω − θ

i

(44)

On the other hand, the volume of distressed ABS is EL (bx )−1 = EL (b1 )−ω −1. Denoting
the price of the distressed ABS by pX , the total nominal value of ABS is




n EL (b1 ) − ω − 1 pX

(45)

The price of the distressed asset is obtained as the solution for the asset market equilibrium




condition, M = n EL (b1 ) − ω − 1 pX :


pX =

(1 − n)(1 − λ) 3 − EL (b1 ) − ω − 2θ




2n EL (b1 ) − ω − 1



(46)

The fundamental value of the ABS in case of a bad signal is p̄X = EL (bx |s). Hence, when
the ABS is purchased at pX , its return will be

p̄X −pX
.
pX

Type 1 banks will bid for the asset

only when the asset price is set below its fundamental value, i.e. pX 6 p̄X , which generates
non-negative return. When pX > p̄X , it is optimal for type 1 bank not to bid for the asset. If
there are a small number of type 2 banks so that a sufficiently large number of type 1 banks
bid for the distressed ABS, the ABS price will be bid up towards its upper limit at pX = p̄X ,
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in which case the expected return from the asset purchase is zero. But if the number of type
2 banks is sufficiently large, the asset price will be established at pX < p̄X ; that is, the type
2 bank will have to sell its assets at a fire sale price. Accordingly, the threshold point of n,
denoted by nX , can be obtained from pX = EL (yx |s) as
nX = 

(1 − λ)
h

E L (b1 ) − ω − 1 E L (b1 |s) −

3
4



h

3
2

− 12 E L (b1 ) − 12 ω − θ

E L (b1 ) − 1 − ω

i

i

+ (1 − λ)

h

3
2

i

− 12 E L (b1 ) − 12 ω − θ
(47)

The ABS price as a function of the number of type 2 banks is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 The price of type 2 banks’ liquidated assets, ABS, is determined in the following way.

X

p =










p̄X

f or n 6 nX



(1 − n)(1 − λ) 3 − EL (b1 ) − ω − 2θ















L

f or n > nX

2n E (b1 ) − ω − 1

If λ = 0, the analysis will be similar to the one in the benchmark model with weak
asset return correlation. However, since type 1 banks’ assets are also severely affected, due
to the bad signal, to the extent that it would have experienced a run were it not for the
government guarantee. Hence, it is very likely that its liquidity preference is high and hence
λ >> 0. In which case, the asset price depreciation can be significant; it can be verified that
λ approaching one brings pX closer to zero.
In this case let us consider the likely appearance of the government in the asset market
as an outside buyer to prop up the asset price. Suppose the government injects liquidity by
purchasing the troubled assets. Let us denote the amount of the public liquidity by F . Then
the total liquidity available M will rise by F . As a consequence, the asset price will rise to


pX =



(1 − n)(1 − λ) 3 − EL (b1 ) − ω − 2θ + F
2n(EL (b1 ) − ω − 1)
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(48)

Figure 7: ABS Price appreciation with public liquidity
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Then the threshold level of the number of type 2 bank, denoted by ñX , at which the ABS
will trade at its fundamental value, is yielded as


(1 − λ)
ñX = 

E L (b



1)

−ω−1

E L (b

1 |s)

−

3
4

3
2



− 21 E L (b1 ) − 21 ω − θ + F



E L (b

1)

−1−ω





+ (1 − λ)

3
2

−

1 L
E (b1 )
2

−

1
ω
2

−θ



(49)
It is readily confirmed that ñX > nX . The comparison between the ABS price with and
without the public liquidity is illustrated in figure 7.
In comparison to the analysis in the previous section, especially figure 5, we can see
that the public liquidity plays the similar role played by external funds raised in capital
market in bolstering asset prices. That is, it increases the threshold number of type 2 banks,
beyond which the asset price falls below its fundamental value; as a consequence, with public
liquidity, the asset price is higher than otherwise for any number of type 2 banks.
Then how is F determined? Suppose the government, when implementing the asset
purchase program, sets a target asset price, which is a negative function of target interest
rate due to present valuation asset pricing; hence if a lower interest rate target implies a
higher asset price target. Let us denote the asset price target by pT . By equating pT to the
expression in 48, we can obtain the expression for F as






F = pT 2n EL (b1 ) − ω − 1 − (1 − n)(1 − λ) 3 − EL (b1 ) − ω − 2θ
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(50)

From equation (50), we can identify several factors that affect the required volume of
public liquidity injection. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3

∂F
∂pT

> 0,

∂F
∂n

> 0,

∂F
∂λ

> 0,

∂F
∂θ

> 0,

∂F
L

∂ E (b1 )

>0

The first four results are quite intuitive. Other things being equal, a larger volume of public
liquidity injection is required i) the larger the asset price target, ii) the larger the number of
banks without government insurance, iii) the stronger the liquidity preference of potential
buyers in asset markets, and iv) the stronger the liquidity shock. More interesting is the
last result which states that the stronger the local thinking effect also leads to a larger F .
Two underlying mechanisms can be identified. First, accordingly to lemma 4, larger EL (b1 )
implies smaller liquidity holdings of type 1 banks; the internal funding sources type 1 bank
can tap to purchase distressed asset is weak, which in turn requires larger public liquidity
injections to prop up asset markets. Second, larger EL (b1 ) implies larger investment in ABS
by type 2 banks; hence in times of stress, the volume of liquidated assets will be larger,
which in turn will also require larger public liquidity injection.

8

Conclusion

The main contribution of this paper has been to extend the model of local thinking to study
bank runs and fire sales, which are key phenomena of financial disruptions and banking crises.
More specifically, we have shown that local thinking behavior affects bank runs and fire sales
in two ways. First, it lowers optimal bank liquidity compared to the case in which banks
have rational expectations. Consequently the banking system becomes fragile and vulnerable
to liquidity shocks. Second, even when a local thinking bank survives bad news, its balance
sheet status is weaker than would have been the case if it had rational expectations; as a
result, the bank may not be able to pledge its future cash flows to raise additional liquidity
for asset purchases; hence, there is further downward pressure on asset prices.
We have also examined the injection of public liquidity in the case where the risky asset
returns are strongly positively correlated due to securitization so that adverse shocks are
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felt uniformly across the banking sector. In this case, even the surviving banks become
risk–averse and pile up liquidity. An important policy question can be raised on the size of
the public liquidity injection. As a first approximation, we have considered a government
asset purchase program that sets the asset price target. This target is established in relation
to a policy agenda for the broader economy. As a policy guide for stabilizing asset markets,
the determination of public liquidity merits further study. Some of the approaches that
can address this issue include welfare analysis of different forms of public liquidity injection
policy, and empirical analysis of the relation between the size of central bank balance sheet
and asset price indexes.
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